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Interest Rate Forecasts:  A Pathology 
 
By C.A.E. Goodhart 
Financial Markets Group 
London School of Economics 
 
and 
 
Wen Bin Lim 
Financial Markets Group 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This is the first of three prospective papers examining how well forecasters can 
predict the future time path of short-term interest rates.  Most prior work has been 
done using US data; in this exercise we use forecasts made for New Zealand (NZ) by 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and those derived from money market 
yield curves in the UK.  In this first exercise we broadly replicate recent US findings 
for NZ and UK, to show that such forecasts in NZ and UK have been excellent for the 
immediate forthcoming quarter, reasonable for the next quarter and useless thereafter.  
Moreover, when ex post errors are assessed depending on whether interest rates have 
been upwards, or downwards, trending, they are shown to have been biased and, 
apparently, inefficient.  In the second paper we shall examine whether (NZ and UK) 
forecasts for inflation exhibit the same syndromes, and whether errors in inflation 
forecasts can help to explain errors in interest rate forecasts.  In the third paper we 
shall set out an hypothesis to explain those findings, and examine whether the 
apparent ex post forecast inefficiencies may still be consistent with ex ante forecast 
efficiency. 
 
Even if the forecasts may be ex ante efficient, their negligible ex post forecasting 
ability suggests that, beyond a six months’ horizon from the forecast date, they would 
be better replaced by a simple ‘no-change thereafter’ assumption.
 2
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The short-term policy interest rate has generally been adjusted in most developed 
countries, at least during the last 20 years or so, in a series of small steps in the same 
direction, followed by a pause and then a, roughly, similar series of steps in the 
opposite direction.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the time-path of policy rates for New 
Zealand, UK and USA. 
 
Figure 1 
Official Cash Rate: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand) 
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Figure 2 
Official Bank Rate: Bank of England 
(Source: Bank of England website) 
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Figure 3 
Federal Reserve 
Federal Funds Target Rate 
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On the face of it, such a behavioural pattern would appear quite easy to predict.  
Moreover, Central Bank behaviour has typically been modelled by fitting a Taylor 
reaction function incorporating a lagged dependent variable with a large, (often 
around 0.8 at a quarterly periodicity), and highly significant coefficient.  But if this 
was, indeed, the reason for such gradualism, then the series of small steps should be 
highly predictable in advance. 
 
The problem is that the evidence shows that they are not well predicted, beyond the 
next few months.  There is a large body of, mainly American, literature to this effect, 
with the prime exponent being Glenn Rudebusch with a variety of co-authors, see in 
particular Rudebusch (1995, 2002 and 2006).  Indeed, prior to the mid 1990s, there is 
some evidence that the market could hardly predict the likely path, or direction of 
movement, of policy rates over the next few months in the USA (see Rudebusch 1995 
and 2002 and the literature cited there).  More recently, with Central Banks having 
become much more transparent about their thinking, their plans and their intentions, 
market forecasts of the future path of policy rates have become quite good over the 
immediately forthcoming quarter, and better than a random walk (no change) 
assumption over the following quarter.  But thereafter they remain as bad as ever, 
(Rudebusch, 2006, and Lange, Sack and Whitesell, 2003). 
 
We contribute to this literature first by extending the empirical analysis to New 
Zealand and the UK, though some similar work on UK data has already been done by 
Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004).  The work on New Zealand is particularly interesting 
since the forecasts are not those derived from the money market, but those made 
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available by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in their Monetary Policy Statements 
about their current expectations for their own future policies. 
 
One of the issues relating to the question of whether a Central Bank should attempt to 
decide upon, and then publish, a prospective future path for its own policy rate, as 
contrasted with relying on the expected path implicit in the money market yield curve, 
is the relative precision of the two sets of forecasts.  A discussion of the general issues 
involved is provided by Goodhart (forthcoming 2008).  For an analytical discussion of 
the effects of the relative forecasting precision on that decision, see Morris and Shin 
(2002) and Svensson (2006). 
  
The question of the likely precision of a Central Bank’s forecast of its own short-run 
policy rate is, however, at least in some large part, empirical.  The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand (RBNZ), a serial innovator in so many aspects of central banking, 
including inflation targeting and the transparency (plus sanctions) approach to bank 
regulation, was, once again, the first to provide a forecast of the (conditional) path of 
its own future policy rates.  It began to do so in 2000 Q1.  That gives 28 observations 
between that date and 2006 Q4, our sample period.  While still short, this is now long 
enough to undertake some preliminary tests to examine forecast precision. 
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Partly for the sake of comparison1, we also explore the accuracy of the implicit 
market forecasts of the path of future short term interest rates in the UK.  We use 
estimates provided by the Bank of England over the period 1992 Q4 until 2004 Q4.  
There are two such series, one derived from the Libor yield curve and one from short-
dated government debt.  We base our choice between these on the relative accuracy of 
their forecasts.  On this basis, as described in Section 3, we choose, and subsequently 
use, the government debt series and its implied forecasts.   
 
In the next Section, Section 2, we report and describe our data series.  Then in Section 
3 of this paper we examine the predictive accuracy of these sets of interest rate 
forecasts.  The results are closely in accord with the earlier findings in the USA.  
Whether the forecast comes from the central bank, or from the market, the predictive 
ability is good, by most econometric standards, over the first quarter following the 
date of the forecast; poor, but significantly better than a no-change, random walk 
forecast, over the second quarter, (from end-month 3 to end-month 6), and effectively 
useless from that horizon onwards. 
 
Worse, however, is to come.  The forecasts, once beyond the end of the first quarter, 
are not only without value, they are, when compared with ex post outcomes, also 
strongly and significantly biased.  This does not, however, necessarily mean that the 
                                                 
1   The UK and New Zealand are different economies, and so one is not strictly comparing like with 
like.  If one was, however, to compare the NZ implicit market forecast accuracy, with that of the RBNZ 
forecast over the same period, (a comparison which we hope that the RBNZ will do), the former will 
obviously be affected by the latter (and possibly vice versa).  Again if a researcher was to compare the 
implied accuracy of the market forecast prior to the introduction of the official forecast with the 
accuracy of the market/official forecast after the RBNZ had started to publish, (another exercise that 
we hope that the RBNZ will undertake), then the NZ economy, their financial system and the economic 
context may have changed over time.  So one can never compare an implicit market forecast with an 
official forecast for interest rates on an exactly like for like basis.  Be that as it may, we view the 
comparison of the RBNZ and the implied UK interest rate forecasts as illustrative, and not definitive in 
any way. 
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forecasts were ex ante inefficient.  We shall demonstrate in Paper 3 of this series how 
ex post bias can yet be consistent with ex ante efficiency in forecasting. 
 
This bias can actually be seen clearly in a visual representation of the forecasts.  The 
RBNZ forecasts, and outcome are shown in Figure 4 and the UK forecast derived 
from the short-dated Government debt yield curve in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4 
RBNZ interest rate forecast (90days, annualized rate)  
published in successive Monetary Policy Statement 
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Figure 5 
UK interest rate forecast (90days, annualized rate) 
derived from the short dated government debt yield curve 
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What is apparent by simple inspection is that when interest rates are on an upwards 
(downwards) cyclical path, the forecast under (over) estimates the actual subsequent 
path of interest rates.  Much the same pattern is also observable in Rudebusch, 2007, 
Figures 1, reproduced as Figure 6 here, for the USA and Sweden, see Adolfson, et al., 
2007, reproduced as Figure 7 here.  One of the reasons why this bias has not been 
more widely recognised is that the biases during up and down cyclical periods are 
almost exactly offsetting, so if an econometrician applies her tests to the complete 
time series (as usual) (s)he will find no aggregate sign of bias.  The distinction 
between the bias in ’up’ and ‘down’ periods is crucial.  A problem with some time 
series, e.g. those for inflation in Paper 2, is that the division of the sample into ‘up’, 
‘down’, and in some cases ‘flat’ periods is not always easy, nor self-evident.  But this 
is not the case for short term interest rates where the, ex post, timing of turning points 
is relatively easier. 
 9
  
 
Figure 6 
Actual and expected federal funds rate 
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Figure 7 
Sequential Forecasts of Sweden’s Repo Rate, 1999:Q1 – 2005:Q5, from the Riksbank 
(First Row), the DSGE Model (Second Row), and the BVAR Model (Third Row) 
 
 
 
The sequencing of this paper proceeds as follows.  We report our data base in Section 
II.  We examine the accuracy of the interest rate forecasts in Section III, and we offer 
some interim conclusions in Section IV.  Recall that we shall continue this exercise in 
Paper 2, exploring whether inflation forecasts exhibit similar error patterns, which 
latter may help to explain the errors in the interest rate forecast; and then in Paper 3 
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we shall assess whether forecasts which appear ex post biased can still be ex ante 
efficient. 
 
II.  The Data Base 
 
Our focus in this paper concerns the accuracy of forecasts for short-term policy-
determined interest rates measured in terms of unbiasedness and the magnitude of 
forecast error.  We examine the data for two countries.  We do so first for New 
Zealand, because this is the country with the longest available published series of 
official projections, as presented by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) in 
their quarterly Monetary Policy Statement.  Our second country is the UK.  In this 
case the Bank of England assumed unchanged future interests, from their current 
level, as the basis of their forecasts, until they moved onto a market-based estimate of 
future policy rates in November 2004.  As described below, we use two alternative 
estimates of future (forecast) policy rates. 
 
In NZ policy announcements, and the release of projections, are usually made early in 
the final month of the calendar quarter, though the research work and discussions in 
their Monetary Policy Committee, will have mostly taken place a couple of weeks 
previously.  Thus the Statement contains a forecast for inflation for the current quarter 
(h = 0), though that will have been made with knowledge of the outturn for the first 
month, and some partial evidence for the second.  The Policy Target Agreement 
between the Treasurer and the Governor is specified in terms of the CPI, and the 
forecast is made in terms of the CPI.  This does not, however, mean that the RBNZ 
focuses exclusively on the overall CPI in its assessment of inflationary pressures.  
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Indeed we think that the distinction between the (forecast) path of CPI and of other 
measures of inflationary pressures, e.g. domestically generated CPI, may have been 
influential in policy decisions at certain times, as discussed further in Section 5. 
 
In NZ the policy-determined rate is taken to be the 90 day (3 month) rate, and the 
forecasts are for that rate.  Thus the current quarter interest rate observation contains 
nearly two months of actual 90 day rates, and just over one month of market forward 
one month rates.  If the MPC meeting results in a (revisable) decision to change 
interest rates in a way that is inconsistent with the prediction that was previously 
embedded in market forward interest rates, then the assumption for the current quarter 
can be revised to make the overall 90 day track look consistent with the policy 
message.  Finally the policy interest rate can be adjusted, after the forecast is 
effectively completed, right up to the day before the Monetary Policy Statement; this 
was done in September 2001 after the terrorist attack.  So, the interest rate forecast for 
the current quarter (h = 0) also contains a small extent of uncertain forecast. 
 
The data, for published official forecasts of the policy rate start in 2000 Q1.  We show 
that data, the forecasts, and the resulting errors, for the policy rate in Appendix Tables 
1A and B.  The data are shown in a format where the forecasts are shown in the same 
row as the actual to be forecast, so the forecast errors can be read off directly. 
 
The British case is somewhat more complicated.  In the past, during the years of our 
sample, the MPC used a constant forward forecast of the repo rate as the conditioning 
assumption for its forecasting exercise.  Whether members of the MPC made any 
mental reservations about the forecast on account of a different subjective view about 
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the future path of policy rates is an individual question that only they can answer 
personally.  But it is hard to treat that constant path as a pure, most likely, forecast.  
At the same time there are, at least, two alternative time series of implied market 
forecasts for future policy rates, that derived from the yield curve of short-dated 
government debt and that derived from the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR).  
There are some complicated technical issues in extracting implied forecasts from 
market yield curves, and such yield curves can be distorted, especially the Libor yield 
curve, as experience in 2007 revealed.  We do not rehearse these difficulties here; 
instead we simply took these data from the Bank of England website, see 
www.bankofengland.co.uk for more information on the procedures used to obtain 
such implicit forecast series, see Anderson and Sleath, (1999, 2001), Brooks, Cooper 
and Scholtes (2000), and Joyce, Relleen and Sorensen (2007).  As will be reported in 
the next Section, the government debt implicit market forecast series had a more 
accurate forecast than the Libor series over our data period, 1992-2004.  Since the 
constant rate assumption was hardly a forecast, most of our work was done with the 
government debt implicit forecast series.  This forecasts the three month Treasury Bill 
series. These series, actual, forecast and errors, (with the forecast lined up against the 
actual it was predicting) are shown in Appendix Table 2A and B, for the government 
debt series, (the other series for Libor is available from the authors on request). 
 
III.  How Accurate are the Interest Rate Forecasts? 
 
We began our examination of this question by running four regressions both for the 
NZ data series and for two sets of implied market forecasts for the UK, derived from 
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the LIBOR and Government Debt yield curve respectively.  These regression 
equations were:- 
(1) IR(t + h) = C1 + C2  Forecast (t, t + h) 
(2) IR(t + h) – IR(t) = C1 + C2 (Forecast t, t + h – IRt) 
(3) IR(t + h) – IR(t + h – 1) = C1 + C2 (Forecast, t, t + h – Forecast, t, t + h – 1) 
(4) IR(t + h) – IR(t + h – 1) = C (Forecast, t, t + h – Forecast, t, t + h – 1). 
Where:  Forecast (t,t+h) = forecast of IR( t+h) made at time, t 
IR(t) = actual interest rate outurn at time, t 
 
The first equation is essentially a Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and 
Zarnowitz, 1969), evaluating how well the forecast can predict the actual h-period 
ahead interest rate outturn (h = 0 to n).  If the forecast perfectly matches the actual 
interest rate outturn for every single period, we would expect to have C2 = 1, and C1 = 
0.  This can be seen as an evaluation of the bias of the forecast. Taking expectation on 
both sides, E{IR(t+h)} = E {C1 + C2 [Forecast(t,t+h)]}. A forecast is unbiased, i.e. 
E{IR(t+h)} = E{[Forecast(t,t+h)]} for all t, if and only if C2 = 1, and C1 = 0. The 
second regression, by subtracting the interest rate level from both sides, allows us to 
focus our attention on the performance of the forecast interest rate difference {IR(t + 
h) – IR(t)}. It asks, as h increases, how accurately can the forecaster forecast h-quarter 
ahead interest rate changes from the present level. The third regression is a slight twist 
on the second, focussing on one-period ahead forecasts; the regression examines the 
forecast performance of one-period ahead interest rate changes {IR(t + h) – IR(t + h – 
1)},  as h increases. The fourth equation just repeats equation 3, but drops the constant 
term.  
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All four regressions assess the accuracy/biasness of interest rate forecasts from 
slightly different angles. In the first three equations, an unbiased forecast will 
necessarily implies a constant term of zero, and a slope coefficient of one. In all four 
equations the coefficient C2 should be unity.  We can test whether these conditions are 
fulfilled with a joint hypothesis test: 
H0: C1=0 and C2=1 
With four equations, three data sets, and h = 0 to 5 for NZ and h = 1 to 8 for the UK 
series, we have some 88 regression results and statistical test scores to report.  Rather 
than asking the reader to plough through them all, we collect these together in 
Appendix 2.  Interpretation of regression results is somewhat subjective.  We give our 
interpretation of them here; the sceptical reader is invited to examine Appendix 2 and 
make his/her own assessment. 
 
Let us start with NZ.  What these results demonstrate is that the RBNZ forecast is 
excellent one quarter ahead, but then becomes useless in forecasting the subsequent 
direction, or extent, of change.  Thus the coefficient C2 in equation (3) becomes -0.04 
at h = 2 (with a R squared of zero), and negative thereafter.  Much the same is true for 
equation 4.  When the equation is run in levels, rather than first differences, i.e. 
equations 1 and 2, the excellent first quarter forecast feeds through into a significantly 
positive forecast of the level in the next few quarters, though it is just the first quarter 
forecast doing all the work. 
 
Turning next to the UK, and starting with the implied forecasts from the government 
debt yield curve, what these tables indicate is that, in the first quarter after the forecast 
is made, the forecast precision of this derived forecast is mediocre (joint test for null 
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hypothesis is rejected for h=3-8) , certainly significantly better than random walk (no 
change), but not nearly as good as the NZ forecast over its first quarter.  However, 
this market based forecast is able also to make a good forecast of the change in rates 
between Q1 and Q2, (whereas the RBNZ could not do that).  The Government yield 
forecast for h = 2 in Tables 3 and 4 is somewhat better than for h = 1.  So the ability 
of the Government yield forecast to predict the level of the policy rate two quarters 
(six months) hence is about the same, or a little better than that of the RBNZ.  
Thereafter, from Q2 onwards, the predictive ability of the Government yield forecast 
becomes insignificantly different from zero, but at least the coefficients have the right 
sign (unlike the RBNZ). 
 
Finally for the implicit forecasts derived from the Libor yield curve these tables 
indicate that, over this sample period, such implicit forecasts have been 
comprehensively worse than those from the Government yield curve, or the RBNZ.  
These provided poor forecasts even for the first two quarters, and useless forecasts 
thereafter.  There are several possible reasons for such worse forecasts, e.g. time 
varying risk premia, data errors in a short sample, but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to try to track them down.  Instead we will focus on the forecasts implied by the 
government yield curve since they have a better record, at least at the short end. 
 
The conclusion of this set of tests is that the precision of interest forecasts beyond the 
next quarter, or two, is approximately zero, whether they are made by the RBNZ or 
the UK market.  Given the gradual adjustments in actual policy rates, this might seem 
surprising.  Why does it happen?  In order to start to answer this question, we start 
with a stylised fact.  When one looks at most macro-economic forecasts, and notably 
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so for interest rates, see Figures 4-7 above, they tend to follow a pattern.  When the 
macro-variable is rising, the forecast increasingly falls below it.  When the macro-
variable is falling, the forecast increasingly lies above it.  This pattern is shown again 
in illustrative form in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
 
So, if we divide the sample period into periods of rising and falling values for the 
variable of concern, in this case the interest rate, during up periods, Actual minus 
Forecast will be tend to persistently positive and during down periods Actual minus 
Forecast will tend to be persistently negative.  There is, however, an important caveat.  
A forecast made during an up (down)-period may extend over several quarters beyond 
the turning point into the next down (up)-period.  Consider, for example, the final 
turning point in Figure 8.  Three forecasts made in the earlier part of the prior upturn 
(---, xxx and …) have a positive Actual minus Forecast after the sign change from up 
to down, and three forecasts made in the latter part of the upturn (-.-.-, ---- and xxx) a 
negative Actual minus Forecast.  Clearly the tendency for Actual minus Forecast to be 
 18
negative in an upturn will be most marked for Forecasts made in an upturn so long as 
that upturn continues, i.e. until the next sign change from up to down, or vice versa.  
Nevertheless we still expect on balance that forecasts made during an upturn 
(downturn) will tend to have positive (negative) Actual minus Forecast outturns even 
after such a sign change, but the result is clearly uncertain.2  Third, the forecasts made 
for the policy rate in the next quarter, (and to a lesser extent into the second quarter) 
are so good, especially for the next quarter for the RBNZ, that no such bias may exist. 
 
In Figures 9 and 10 we reproduce the charts for the policy rate in NZ and UK, 
marking the points at which we have taken the turning points to be.  Given these 
turning points we reproduce the number of observations of errors (Actual minus 
Forecast) until the first sign change in up and down periods separately, and then 
between the first and second sign change, of all forecasts made during up and down 
periods respectively, together with their mean error and standard deviation, and we 
show the p values of such values coming from a distribution whose true underlying 
mean error was zero.  This is shown in Table 1 for the RBNZ forecast and in Table 2 
for the Government yield forecasts. 
 
                                                 
2   When interest rates are volatile, and sign changes are more frequent, nothing useful can be said 
about the likely outcomes of Actual minus Forecast after a second sign change. 
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Figure 9 
RBNZ interest rate (3 months annualized rate) 
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Figure 10 
UK Gov curve implied forward rate (3 months annualized rate) 
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Let us go through the RBNZ Table 1 starting with the top left quadrant table.  The top 
line shows that there were 19 forecasts made during up periods.  Of these in their first 
quarter, 11 had positively signed errors (Actual > Forecast) and 8 negatively signed 
errors (Actual < Forecast).  The mean error was a very small positive sum (0.04), with 
a p value of 0.06.  Of these 19 forecasts, for 16 the up period of actual policy rates 
was still in place in their second quarter.  Of these 16, 9 had a positive error and 7 a 
negative error.  Again the mean error was small positive, insignificantly different 
from zero.  From then on out to quarter 9, the general picture changes.  There are 45 
positive errors and only 4 negative errors.  The mean size of the positive error rises 
steadily to over 100 basis points, and the mean error is statistically significantly 
different from zero in a couple of cases. 
 21
Table 1 
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Let us next turn to the next right hand side sub-table.  Here there were nine forecasts 
made during periods of downturn.  In the first quarter of the forecast, there were three 
positive errors and six negative errors, the mean error was a small negative total (-
0.04) with a p value of 0.04.  Interest rate downturns are shorter and sharper than 
upturns, so no forecast originally made in a downturn had that down period of actual 
interest rates last beyond the fifth quarter.  Once the forecast was still in a downturn 
(beyond the first quarter) the asymmetry becomes extreme; there are 16 negative 
errors and 0 positive errors.  The absolute size of the negative error rises rapidly to 
over 100 bps by Q4, and is significantly different from zero in Qs 3 and 4.   
 
The bottom left hand sub-table shows the outcome for forecasts made in a period 
when actual interest rates had been going down, but after the sign change from a 
down period to an up period.  By definition there can be no observations in the top 
row.  In two cases the down period of actual interest rates switched to an up period in 
the second quarter of the forecast.  In this sub-table every single observation is again 
negative (Actual < Forecast), the absolute scale of the negative values rises, again to 
over -100 bps and several are significantly different from zero. 
 
In the case of the bottom right hand side sub-table, the outcome is much less marked 
and extreme.  This sub-table shows the error outcome for forecasts made initially 
during upturns, but after there has been a change to a downturn.  In this case there is 
rough equality between positive and negative errors, the mean size of error is usually 
small and except in one case (involving only two observations) totally insignificant. 
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Overall upturns last longer than downturns, so more forecasts are made during 
upturns, and there are more error observations during upturns (117) than in downturns 
(52).  In contrast, the extent of bias and inefficiency in errors in forecasts made 
initially during downturns is considerably greater than those made during upturns.  So 
if you take the sample period as a whole, containing both periods of upturn and 
downturn, the biases net out.  Regression analyses covering the whole sample period, 
therefore, tend to show that forecasts, though poor, are neither inefficient nor biased.  
But this obscures the finding here that there are, in fact, large, but offsetting, biases 
and inefficiencies in forecasts made during upturns and downturns. 
 
Perhaps an easier and more standard way of demonstrating this result, suggested to us 
by Andrew Patton, is to run a regression of the forecast error, at various horizons, 
against two indicator variables, one for up periods (C1) and one for down periods 
(C2).  The hypothesis is that the up period indictor variable (C1) is positive (actual > 
forecast) and the down period indicator (C2) is negative (actual < forecast). 
 
The results for NZ are as follows:- 
 
Table 2 
 
(A)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date (whole data set) 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.41 0.06 0.26 -0.35 0.00 
Q2 0.62 0.15 0.07 -0.69 0.00 
Q3 0.58 0.23 0.06 -0.88 0.00 
Q4 0.36 0.23 0.23 -0.99 0.00 
Q5 0.27 0.24 0.33 -1.06 0.01 
Q6 0.20 0.23 0.49 -1.07 0.05 
Q7 0.03 0.13 0.79 -0.95 0.27 
Q8 -0.30 0.04 0.97 -0.52 0.78 
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(B)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date, 
but only includes period during which sign is unchanged 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.41 0.06 0.26 -0.35 0.00 
Q2 0.76 0.22 0.00 -0.70 0.00 
Q3 0.87 0.41 0.00 -1.13 0.00 
Q4 0.81 0.56 0.00 -1.53 0.00 
Q5 0.86 0.73 0.00 -2.13 0.00 
Q6 - - - - - 
Q7 - - - - - 
Q8 - - - - - 
 
 
(C)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date (whole data set) 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.41 0.06 0.26 -0.35 0.00 
Q2 0.51 0.12 0.17 -0.64 0.00 
Q3 0.39 0.16 0.25 -0.76 0.00 
Q4 0.17 0.15 0.50 -0.72 0.02 
Q5 0.05 0.10 0.72 -0.57 0.13 
Q6 -0.07 -0.15 0.72 -0.17 0.73 
Q7 0.00 -0.49 0.38 0.41 0.57 
Q8 -0.29 -0.27 0.80 0.23 0.86 
 
 
(D)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date, 
but only includes period during which sign is unchanged 
 
Same results as (B) above. 
 
 
Turning next to the Table (Table 3) showing the results for the Government yield 
implied forecasts, we find in effect qualitatively identical results. 
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Table 3 
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Again we run the same, simpler, regression exercise.  The results are:- 
 
Table 4 
(A)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date (whole data set) 
 
H = R-sqr S1 P-value S2 P-value 
1 0.37 0.38 0.00 -0.03 0.69 
2 0.39 0.43 0.00 -0.26 0.00 
3 0.53 0.44 0.00 -0.61 0.00 
4 0.40 0.22 0.21 -0.83 0.00 
5 0.30 -0.06 0.78 -0.91 0.00 
6 0.25 -0.48 0.09 -0.82 0.00 
7 0.31 -0.78 0.01 -0.80 0.00 
8 0.41 -1.04 0.00 -0.83 0.00 
 
 
(B)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date, 
but only includes period during which sign is unchanged 
 
H = R-sqr S1 P-value S2 P-value 
1 0.37 0.38 0.00 -0.03 0.69 
2 0.47 0.46 0.00 -0.32 0.00 
3 0.70 0.56 0.00 -0.77 0.00 
4 0.81 0.57 0.00 -1.17 0.00 
5 0.88 0.43 0.07 -1.46 0.00 
6 0.93 0.24 0.32 -1.47 0.00 
 
(C)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date (whole data set) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date, 
but only includes period during which sign is unchanged. 
 
Same results as (B) above. 
 
H = R-sqr S1 P-value S2 P-value 
1 0.37 0.38 0.00 -0.03 0.69 
2 0.38 0.47 0.00 -0.23 0.01 
3 0.34 0.35 0.02 -0.48 0.00 
4 0.27 0.12 0.57 -0.66 0.00 
5 0.22 -0.21 0.45 -0.70 0.00 
6 0.24 -0.62 0.05 -0.68 0.01 
7 0.32 -0.97 0.00 -0.70 0.00 
8 0.44 -1.26 0.00 -0.72 0.00 
 27
In this latter, UK case, however, the forecasts included some sizeable average errors, 
whereby the forecasts implied that interest rates would tend to become higher than 
was the case in the historical event (actual < forecast).  This average error tended to 
increase, approximately linearly, as the horizon (h) increased.  This is shown in Figure 
11 and Table 5 below:- 
 
Figure 11 
Average Forecast Error
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Table 5 
H= 
Average 
Forecast 
Error 
Q1 0.1311 
Q2 0.0250 
Q3 -0.1552 
Q4 -0.3612 
Q5 -0.5240 
Q6 -0.6616 
Q7 -0.7939 
Q8 -0.9217 
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After correcting for this average error, and re-running,3 the results became:- 
 
Table 6 
(A)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date  
(whole data set, with average forecast error removed) 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.27 0.25 0.01 -0.16 0.03 
Q2 0.37 0.41 0.00 -0.28 0.00 
Q3 0.50 0.59 0.00 -0.46 0.00 
Q4 0.30 0.59 0.00 -0.47 0.01 
Q5 0.12 0.46 0.06 -0.38 0.08 
Q6 0.00 0.18 0.50 -0.16 0.53 
Q7 -0.02 0.01 0.97 -0.01 0.97 
Q8 -0.02 -0.12 0.67 0.09 0.70 
 
 
(B)  Indicator variable is based on state at out-turn date, but only includes period 
during which sign is unchanged, with average forecast error removed 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.27 0.25 0.01 -0.16 0.03 
Q2 0.45 0.44 0.00 -0.34 0.00 
Q3 0.66 0.72 0.00 -0.62 0.00 
Q4 0.74 0.93 0.00 -0.78 0.00 
Q5 0.79 0.95 0.00 -0.94 0.00 
Q6 0.83 0.90 0.00 -0.80 0.00 
Q7 0.80 0.93 0.00 -0.84 0.00 
Q8 0.85 0.85 0.00 -0.81 0.00 
 
 
                                                 
3   The average forecast error in NZ was much smaller, and did not vary systematically with h.  We ran 
similar adjusted regressions for NZ, but the results were closely similar to those shown in Table 3 
above. 
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 (C)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date  
(whole data set, with average forecast error removed) 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.27 0.25 0.01 -0.16 0.03 
Q2 0.37 0.44 0.00 -0.25 0.00 
Q3 0.29 0.51 0.00 -0.32 0.01 
Q4 0.14 0.48 0.03 -0.29 0.08 
Q5 0.02 0.31 0.26 -0.18 0.40 
Q6 -0.02 0.04 0.91 -0.02 0.93 
Q7 -0.01 -0.17 0.58 0.10 0.68 
Q8 0.03 -0.34 0.24 0.20 0.37 
 
  
(D)  Indicator variable is based on state at forecast date, but only includes period 
during which sign is unchanged, with average forecast error removed 
 
H = 
Adj R-
sqr C(1) P-value C(2) P-value 
Q1 0.27 0.25 0.01 -0.16 0.03 
Q2 0.45 0.44 0.00 -0.34 0.00 
Q3 0.66 0.72 0.00 -0.62 0.00 
Q4 0.74 0.93 0.00 -0.78 0.00 
Q5 0.79 0.95 0.00 -0.94 0.00 
Q6 0.83 0.90 0.00 -0.80 0.00 
Q7 0.80 0.93 0.00 -0.84 0.00 
Q8 0.85 0.85 0.00 -0.81 0.00 
 
 
It was known before in the literature that interest rate forecasts beyond the next few 
months were abysmally poor, with no precision nor predictive power.  What we add 
here is the finding is that, once one separates the data period into periods of cyclical 
rises (falls) in actual policy rates, they are significantly biased as well. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
(1) The official, and market, forecasts of interest rates that we have studied here 
have significant predictive power over the next two quarters, but virtually 
none thereafter.  When forecast precision is effectively zero, as after two 
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quarters hence, it is probably best to acknowledge this, e.g. by using a ‘no 
change’ thereafter assumption. 
 
(2) These interest rate forecasts are systematically biased, underestimating future 
policy rates during upturns and overestimating them during downturns.  We 
shall now proceed to explore reasons why this might have been so in Papers 2 
and 3. 
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 Appendix Table 1A: RBNZ interest rate forecast 
Date Interest Rate r(t,t) r(t-1,t) R(t-2,t) r(t-3,t) r(t-4,t) r(t-5,t) r(t-6,t) r(t-7,t) r(t-8,t) 
 00Q1   5.974 5.86 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 00Q2   6.732 6.46 6.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 00Q3   6.740 6.83 6.84 6.49 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 00Q4   6.667 6.64 6.83 7.15 6.70 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 01Q1   6.412 6.50 6.84 6.91 7.36 6.88 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 01Q2   5.850 5.84 6.31 7.10 7.01 7.48 7.05 N/A N/A N/A 
 01Q3   5.736 5.79 5.83 6.30 7.16 7.07 7.53 7.19 N/A N/A 
 01Q4   4.966 5.07 5.87 5.81 6.34 7.26 7.10 7.53 7.27 N/A 
 02Q1   5.040 4.91 5.18 5.90 5.74 6.38 7.38 7.13 7.51 7.28 
 02Q2   5.819 5.72 5.41 5.22 5.92 5.74 6.39 N/A N/A N/A 
 02Q3   5.913 5.97 6.30 5.81 5.20 5.98 5.73 6.38 N/A N/A 
 02Q4   5.898 6.00 6.16 6.70 6.08 5.14 6.10 5.76 6.36 N/A 
 03Q1   5.828 5.88 6.00 6.26 6.93 6.22 5.12 6.23 5.90 6.35 
 03Q2   5.439 5.47 5.88 6.00 6.27 7.03 6.34 N/A N/A N/A 
 03Q3   5.123 5.12 5.32 5.88 6.00 6.11 7.04 6.18 N/A N/A 
 03Q4   5.290 5.32 5.22 5.31 5.88 6.00 5.88 6.87 5.96 N/A 
 04Q1   5.498 5.51 5.54 5.28 5.31 5.88 6.00 5.69 6.72 5.79 
 04Q2   5.857 5.76 5.67 5.71 5.31 5.32 5.88 N/A N/A N/A 
 04Q3   6.440 6.35 6.14 5.73 5.82 5.37 5.36 5.88 N/A N/A 
 04Q4   6.728 6.74 6.61 6.31 5.75 5.90 5.47 5.44 5.88 N/A 
 05Q1   6.865 6.80 6.80 6.68 6.40 5.75 5.95 5.57 5.52 5.88 
 05Q2   7.043 7.00 7.00 6.83 6.73 6.45 5.75 N/A N/A N/A 
 05Q3   7.049 7.05 7.12 7.07 6.82 6.76 6.49 5.77 N/A N/A 
 05Q4   7.493 7.47 7.21 7.15 7.07 6.83 6.78 6.53 5.81 N/A 
 06Q1   7.549 7.57 7.61 7.32 7.14 7.09 6.82 6.78 6.54 5.84 
 06Q2   7.478 7.49 7.55 7.59 7.31 7.15 7.10 N/A N/A N/A 
 06Q3   7.511 7.48 7.55 7.56 7.58 7.30 7.16 7.09 N/A N/A 
 06Q4   7.643 7.62 7.62 7.53 7.53 7.59 7.29 7.17 7.09 N/A 
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Appendix Table 1B 
Forecast Error r(t,t) r(t-1,t) r(t-2,t) r(t-3,t) r(t-4,t) r(t-5,t) r(t-6,t) r(t-7,t) r(t-8,t) 
 00Q1   0.11 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 00Q2   0.27 0.52 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 00Q3   -0.09 -0.10 0.25 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 00Q4   0.03 -0.16 -0.48 -0.03 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 01Q1   -0.09 -0.42 -0.50 -0.95 -0.47 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 01Q2   0.01 -0.46 -1.25 -1.16 -1.63 -1.20 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 01Q3   -0.05 -0.09 -0.56 -1.42 -1.33 -1.79 -1.46 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 01Q4   -0.10 -0.90 -0.84 -1.37 -2.29 -2.13 -2.56 -2.30 #VALUE! 
 02Q1   0.13 -0.14 -0.86 -0.70 -1.34 -2.34 -2.10 -2.47 -2.24 
 02Q2   0.10 0.41 0.60 -0.10 0.08 -0.57 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 02Q3   -0.06 -0.38 0.10 0.72 -0.07 0.18 -0.47 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 02Q4   -0.10 -0.26 -0.80 -0.18 0.75 -0.21 0.14 -0.47 #VALUE! 
 03Q1   -0.05 -0.17 -0.43 -1.11 -0.39 0.71 -0.41 -0.07 -0.52 
 03Q2   -0.03 -0.44 -0.56 -0.84 -1.59 -0.90 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 03Q3   0.00 -0.20 -0.76 -0.88 -0.98 -1.91 -1.06 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 03Q4   -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.59 -0.71 -0.59 -1.58 -0.67 #VALUE! 
 04Q1   -0.01 -0.04 0.22 0.19 -0.38 -0.50 -0.19 -1.22 -0.29 
 04Q2   0.10 0.19 0.15 0.55 0.54 -0.02 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 04Q3   0.09 0.30 0.71 0.62 1.07 1.08 0.56 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 04Q4   -0.01 0.11 0.41 0.98 0.82 1.26 1.29 0.85 #VALUE! 
 05Q1   0.06 0.07 0.19 0.46 1.11 0.92 1.30 1.34 0.98 
 05Q2   0.04 0.05 0.21 0.31 0.59 1.29 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 05Q3   0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.23 0.29 0.56 1.28 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 05Q4   0.02 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.66 0.71 0.97 1.68 #VALUE! 
 06Q1   -0.02 -0.06 0.23 0.41 0.46 0.73 0.77 1.01 1.71 
 06Q2   -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 0.17 0.32 0.38 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 06Q3   0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.21 0.35 0.42 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
 06Q4   0.02 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.36 0.48 0.56 #VALUE! 
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Appendix Table 2A 
 
Table 1: UK interest rate forecast implied by government yield curve 
  r R(t-1,t) R(t-2,t) R(t-3,t) R(t-4,t) R(t-5,t) R(t-6,t) R(t-7,t) R(t-8,t) 
1992Q4 7.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1993Q1 6.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1993Q2 6.00 N/A 5.95 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1993Q3 6.00 N/A 5.22 6.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1993Q4 5.50 N/A 5.60 5.36 6.56 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1994Q1 5.25 N/A 5.12 6.02 5.66 6.85 N/A N/A N/A 
1994Q2 5.25 N/A 5.14 5.17 6.43 5.98 7.07 N/A N/A 
1994Q3 5.75 N/A 4.77 5.17 5.38 6.76 6.28 7.24 N/A 
1994Q4 6.25 N/A 5.36 4.94 5.30 5.65 7.03 6.56 7.40 
1995Q1 6.75 N/A 6.55 6.08 5.21 5.49 5.92 7.26 6.81 
1995Q2 6.75 N/A N/A 7.23 6.73 5.49 5.71 6.17 7.47 
1995Q3 6.75 N/A 7.14 7.42 7.80 7.27 5.75 5.93 6.40 
1995Q4 6.50 6.49 6.97 7.73 7.97 8.24 7.69 5.98 6.14 
1996Q1 6.00 N/A 6.76 7.39 8.20 8.39 8.57 8.01 6.18 
1996Q2 5.75 5.68 6.16 7.08 7.73 8.52 8.68 8.83 8.26 
1996Q3 5.75 N/A 5.64 6.29 7.39 7.95 8.72 8.88 9.02 
1996Q4 6.00 5.60 N/A 5.84 6.50 7.63 8.09 8.85 9.00 
1997Q1 6.00 N/A 5.74 6.42 6.12 6.71 7.82 8.18 8.93 
1997Q2 6.50 N/A 6.63 6.01 6.74 6.37 6.90 7.96 8.24 
1997Q3 7.00 6.22 N/A 6.88 6.34 7.01 6.60 7.06 8.06 
1997Q4 7.25 6.87 6.51 6.43 7.04 6.62 7.24 6.80 7.19 
1998Q1 7.25 7.26 6.95 6.67 6.57 7.13 6.86 7.43 6.97 
1998Q2 7.50 7.00 7.22 6.99 6.76 6.66 7.19 7.04 7.58 
1998Q3 7.50 6.94 6.69 7.10 6.99 6.80 6.73 7.23 7.19 
1998Q4 6.25 7.21 6.71 6.51 7.00 6.98 6.83 6.78 7.25 
1999Q1 5.50 6.10 6.96 6.53 6.39 6.93 6.98 6.85 6.82 
1999Q2 5.00 4.80 5.79 6.69 6.41 6.30 6.87 6.98 6.87 
1999Q3 5.25 4.89 4.69 5.51 6.46 6.31 6.21 6.82 6.98 
1999Q4 5.50 4.89 4.89 4.71 5.28 6.26 6.21 6.13 6.77 
2000Q1 6.00 5.37 5.10 4.94 4.72 5.10 6.09 6.13 6.05 
2000Q2 6.00 6.07 5.79 5.45 5.02 4.70 4.96 5.93 6.05 
2000Q3 6.00 6.14 6.29 6.00 5.75 5.08 4.66 4.86 5.80 
2000Q4 6.00 5.95 6.36 6.40 6.09 5.93 5.11 4.61 4.77 
2001Q1 5.75 5.65 6.08 6.44 6.43 6.13 6.02 5.13 4.56 
2001Q2 5.25 5.34 5.52 6.12 6.43 6.43 6.13 6.06 5.13 
2001Q3 5.00 4.90 5.16 5.47 6.09 6.36 6.41 6.10 6.06 
2001Q4 4.00 4.66 4.89 5.14 5.46 6.03 6.26 6.38 6.05 
2002Q1 4.00 3.77 4.83 4.95 5.14 5.46 5.96 6.15 6.34 
2002Q2 4.00 4.01 3.92 5.01 5.02 5.15 5.44 5.89 6.04 
2002Q3 4.00 4.17 4.41 4.14 5.12 5.08 5.14 5.42 5.82 
2002Q4 4.00 3.74 4.59 4.68 4.32 5.19 5.12 5.13 5.39 
2003Q1 3.75 3.72 3.80 4.90 4.85 4.47 5.22 5.14 5.12 
2003Q2 3.75 3.38 3.68 3.98 5.12 4.97 4.59 5.24 5.15 
2003Q3 3.50 3.34 3.27 3.76 4.19 5.27 5.04 4.69 5.24 
2003Q4 3.75 3.36 3.27 3.24 3.89 4.37 5.37 5.09 4.77 
2004Q1 4.00 3.96 3.60 3.28 3.29 4.02 4.52 5.44 5.12 
2004Q2 4.50 3.95 4.18 3.84 3.35 3.38 4.13 4.64 5.49 
2004Q3 4.75 4.42 4.10 4.35 4.03 3.44 3.49 4.24 4.73 
2004Q4 4.75 4.80 4.68 4.19 4.49 4.18 3.54 3.60 4.33 
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Forecast 
Error R(t-1,t) R(t-2,t) R(t-3,t) R(t-4,t) R(t-5,t) R(t-6,t) R(t-7,t) R(t-8,t) 
1992Q4 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1993Q1 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1993Q2 #VALUE! 0.05 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1993Q3 #VALUE! 0.78 -0.18 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1993Q4 #VALUE! -0.10 0.14 -1.06 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1994Q1 #VALUE! 0.13 -0.77 -0.41 -1.60 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1994Q2 #VALUE! 0.11 0.08 -1.18 -0.73 -1.82 #VALUE! #VALUE! 
1994Q3 #VALUE! 0.98 0.58 0.37 -1.01 -0.53 -1.49 #VALUE! 
1994Q4 #VALUE! 0.89 1.31 0.95 0.60 -0.78 -0.31 -1.15 
1995Q1 #VALUE! 0.20 0.67 1.54 1.26 0.83 -0.51 -0.06 
1995Q2 #VALUE! #VALUE! -0.48 0.02 1.26 1.04 0.58 -0.72 
1995Q3 #VALUE! -0.39 -0.67 -1.05 -0.52 1.00 0.82 0.35 
1995Q4 0.01 -0.47 -1.23 -1.47 -1.74 -1.19 0.52 0.36 
1996Q1 #VALUE! -0.76 -1.39 -2.20 -2.39 -2.57 -2.01 -0.18 
1996Q2 0.07 -0.41 -1.33 -1.98 -2.77 -2.93 -3.08 -2.51 
1996Q3 #VALUE! 0.11 -0.54 -1.64 -2.20 -2.97 -3.13 -3.27 
1996Q4 0.40 #VALUE! 0.16 -0.50 -1.63 -2.09 -2.85 -3.00 
1997Q1 #VALUE! 0.26 -0.42 -0.12 -0.71 -1.82 -2.18 -2.93 
1997Q2 #VALUE! -0.13 0.49 -0.24 0.13 -0.40 -1.46 -1.74 
1997Q3 0.78 #VALUE! 0.12 0.66 -0.01 0.40 -0.06 -1.06 
1997Q4 0.38 0.74 0.82 0.21 0.63 0.01 0.45 0.06 
1998Q1 -0.01 0.30 0.58 0.68 0.12 0.39 -0.18 0.28 
1998Q2 0.50 0.28 0.51 0.74 0.84 0.31 0.46 -0.08 
1998Q3 0.56 0.81 0.40 0.51 0.70 0.77 0.27 0.31 
1998Q4 -0.96 -0.46 -0.26 -0.75 -0.73 -0.58 -0.53 -1.00 
1999Q1 -0.60 -1.46 -1.03 -0.89 -1.43 -1.48 -1.35 -1.32 
1999Q2 0.20 -0.79 -1.69 -1.41 -1.30 -1.87 -1.98 -1.87 
1999Q3 0.36 0.56 -0.26 -1.21 -1.06 -0.96 -1.57 -1.73 
1999Q4 0.61 0.61 0.79 0.22 -0.76 -0.71 -0.63 -1.27 
2000Q1 0.63 0.90 1.06 1.28 0.90 -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 
2000Q2 -0.07 0.21 0.55 0.98 1.30 1.04 0.07 -0.05 
2000Q3 -0.14 -0.29 0.00 0.25 0.92 1.34 1.14 0.20 
2000Q4 0.05 -0.36 -0.40 -0.09 0.07 0.89 1.39 1.23 
2001Q1 0.10 -0.33 -0.69 -0.68 -0.38 -0.27 0.62 1.19 
2001Q2 -0.09 -0.27 -0.87 -1.18 -1.18 -0.88 -0.81 0.12 
2001Q3 0.10 -0.16 -0.47 -1.09 -1.36 -1.41 -1.10 -1.06 
2001Q4 -0.66 -0.89 -1.14 -1.46 -2.03 -2.26 -2.38 -2.05 
2002Q1 0.23 -0.83 -0.95 -1.14 -1.46 -1.96 -2.15 -2.34 
2002Q2 -0.01 0.08 -1.01 -1.02 -1.15 -1.44 -1.89 -2.04 
2002Q3 -0.17 -0.41 -0.14 -1.12 -1.08 -1.14 -1.42 -1.82 
2002Q4 0.26 -0.59 -0.68 -0.32 -1.19 -1.12 -1.13 -1.39 
2003Q1 0.03 -0.05 -1.15 -1.10 -0.72 -1.47 -1.39 -1.37 
2003Q2 0.37 0.07 -0.23 -1.37 -1.22 -0.84 -1.49 -1.40 
2003Q3 0.16 0.23 -0.26 -0.69 -1.77 -1.54 -1.19 -1.74 
2003Q4 0.39 0.48 0.51 -0.14 -0.62 -1.62 -1.34 -1.02 
2004Q1 0.04 0.40 0.72 0.71 -0.02 -0.52 -1.44 -1.12 
2004Q2 0.55 0.32 0.66 1.15 1.12 0.37 -0.14 -0.99 
2004Q3 0.33 0.65 0.40 0.72 1.31 1.26 0.51 0.02 
2004Q4 -0.05 0.07 0.56 0.26 0.57 1.21 1.15 0.42 
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Appendix 2 
 
Regression results of running the following regressions:- 
 
(1) IR(t + h) = C1 + C2  Forecast (t, t + h) 
(2) IR(t + h) – IR(t) = C1 + C2 (Forecast t, t + h – IRt) 
(3) IR(t + h) – IR(t + h – 1) = C1 + C2 (Forecast, t, t + h – Forecast, t, t + h – 1) 
(4) IR(t + h) – IR(t + h – 1) = C (Forecast, t, t + h – Forecast, t, t + h – 1). 
 
The first two equations allow us to undertake the Mincer-Zarnowitz test (WBL ref) of 
the null hypothesis that C1 = 0 and C2 = 1. 
 
The results were:- 
A.  New Zealand 
 
 
Equation (1) 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
0 -0.01 (0.96) 
1.00 
(0.00) 0.99 1.77 
1 -0.23 (0.64) 
1.02 
(0.00) 0.88 1.53 
2 0.30 (0.74) 
0.93 
(0.00) 0.65 0.93 
3 1.51 (0.24) 
0.74 
(0.00) 0.39 0.34 
4 3.71 (0.03) 
0.40 
(0.12) 0.11 0.28 
5 5.71 (0.00) 
0.09 
(0.76) 0.00 0.15 
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Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) = C1 + C2* Forecast (t, t + h) 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F-
statistics 0.7245 0.4351 0.3441 0.2153 0.0459 0.0095 
Chi-
square 0.7216 0.4229 0.3277 0.1934 0.0285 0.0029 
 
 
Equation (2) 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 -0.16 (0.07) 
1.60 
(0.00) 0.34 1.61 
2 -0.15 (0.31) 
1.02 
(0.02) 0.19 1.01 
3 -0.09 (0.66) 
0.72 
(0.12) 0.10 0.45 
4 0.13 (0.61) 
0.10 
(0.84) 0.00 0.47 
5 0.37 (0.20) 
-0.38 
(0.46) 0.03 0.34 
 
Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) – IR(t) = C1 + C2* Forecast (t, t + h) – IR(t)] 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 1 2 3 4 5 
F-
statistics 0.1886 0.3878 0.4224 0.1595 0.0327 
Chi-
square 0.1679 0.3732 0.4087 0.1356 0.0175 
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Equation (3) 
i = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 0.13 (0.07) 
1.29 
(0.00) 0.43 2.06 
2 0.04 (0.65) 
-0.04 
(0.94) 0.00 1.23 
3 0.07 (0.37) 
-0.68 
(0.39) 0.03 1.37 
4 0.09 (0.28) 
-1.29 
(0.22) 0.07 1.37 
5 0.09 (0.26) 
-1.28 
(0.18) 0.08 1.28 
 
 
Equation (4) 
h = C1 (P value) R sq DW 
1 0.93 (0.00) 0.35 1.66 
2 0.11 (0.79) -0.01 1.26 
3 -0.31 (0.64) -0.00 1.27 
4 -0.77 (0.41) 0.02 1.25 
5 -0.92 (0.31) 0.02 1.19 
 
 
B.  UK Forecasts derived from the Short-term Government Yield Curve 
 
Table 1 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 0.37 (0.22) 
0.95 
(0.00) 0.91 1.61 
2 0.77 (0.06) 
0.86 
(0.00) 0.77 0.88 
3 1.21 (0.02) 
0.76 
(0.00) 0.62 0.55 
4 1.82 (0.01) 
0.63 
(0.00) 0.45 0.40 
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5 2.39 (0.00) 
0.52 
(0.00) 0.32 0.32 
6 2.68 (0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 0.26 0.31 
7 2.51 (0.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 0.27 0.30 
8 2.04 (0.02) 
0.54 
(0.00) 0.33 0.32 
 
Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) = C1 + C2* Forecast (t, t + h) 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
F-
statistics 0.1130 0.1727 0.0133 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
Chi-
square 0.0962 0.1601 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 0.08 (0.39) 
0.73 
(0.03) 0.14 1.52 
2 0.01 (0.91) 
0.90 
(0.00) 0.34 0.95 
3 -0.15 (0.18) 
0.88 
(0.00) 0.34 0.63 
4 -0.31 (0.04) 
0.73 
(0.00) 0.26 0.48 
5 -0.39 (0.03) 
0.58 
(0.00) 0.19 0.41 
6 -0.45 (0.02) 
0.48 
(0.01) 0.15 0.39 
7 -0.53 (0.01) 
0.48 
(0.00) 0.18 0.38 
8 -0.64 (0.00) 
0.51 
(0.00) 0.26 0.41 
 
Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) – IR(t) = C1 + C2* [Forecast (t, t + h) – IR(t)] 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
F-
statistics 0.1120 .08374 0.3063 0.0190 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-
square 0.0953 0.8368 0.2965 0.0129 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 3 
i = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 0.08 (0.39) 
0.73 
(0.03) 0.14 1.51 
2 -0.14 (0.04) 
0.84 
(0.01) 0.19 1.52 
3 -0.10 (0.16) 
0.46 
(0.10) 0.06 1.12 
4 -0.07 (0.38) 
0.24 
(0.42) 0.02 1.01 
5 -0.08 (0.30) 
0.46 
(0.21) 0.03 1.05 
6 -0.07 (0.32) 
0.61 
(0.15) 0.05 1.05 
7 -0.05 (0.47) 
0.53 
(0.30) 0.03 1.03 
8 -0.05 (0.45) 
0.52 
(0.38) 0.02 1.00 
 
 
Table 4 
h = C (P value) R sq DW 
1 0.54 (0.03) 0.12 1.39 
2 0.63 (0.05) 0.07 1.29 
3 0.23 (0.32) 0.01 1.05 
4 0.07 (0.75) -0.00 0.98 
5 0.23 (0.42) 0.01 1.02 
6 0.36 (0.30) 0.02 1.02 
7 0.34 (0.44) 0.01 1.00 
8 0.31 (0.54) 0.01 0.99 
 
 
C.  UK Forecasts derived from the Libor Yield Curve 
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Table 1 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 0.82 (0.08) 
0.82 
(0.00) 0.71 0.75 
2 1.19 (0.03) 
0.75 
(0.00) 0.60 0.52 
3 1.81 (0.01) 
0.63 
(0.00) 0.42 0.46 
4 2.35 (0.01) 
0.52 
(0.00) 0.28 0.37 
5 2.74 (0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 0.20 0.30 
6 2.93 (0.00) 
0.40 
(0.01) 0.16 0.33 
7 2.34 (0.02) 
0.48 
(0.00) 0.21 0.33 
8 1.18 (0.25) 
0.64 
(0.00) 0.33 0.33 
 
Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) = C1 + C2* Forecast (t, t + h) 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
F-
statistics 0.0168 0.0027 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-
square 0.0115 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 2 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 -0.07 (0.35) 
0.20 
(0.24) 0.03 1.49 
2 -0.12 (0.25) 
0.33 
(0.08) 0.07 0.73 
3 -0.16 (0.28) 
0.27 
(0.18) 0.04 0.61 
4 -0.21 (0.25) 
0.27 
(0.20) 0.04 0.50 
5 -0.30 (0.16) 
0.29 
(0.15) 0.05 0.47 
6 -0.39 (0.10) 
0.30 
(0.13) 0.05 0.43 
7 -0.62 (0.01) 
0.45 
(0.02) 0.14 0.45 
8 -0.91 (0.00) 
0.63 
(0.00) 0.29 0.39 
 
Mincer-Zarnowitz test 
IR(t + h) – IR(t) = C1 + C2* [Forecast (t, t + h) – IR(t)] 
Null hypothesis:  C1 = 0 and C2 = 1 
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
F-
statistics 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-
square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 3 
h = C1 (P value) 
C2 
(P value) R sq DW 
1 -0.07 (0.35) 
0.20 
(0.23) 0.03 1.49 
2 -0.03 (0.65) 
0.30 
(0.24) 0.03 2.03 
3 -0.05 (0.52) 
0.37 
(0.34) 0.02 2.04 
4 -0.0 (0.31) 
0.56 
(0.19) 0.04 2.06 
5 -0.05 (0.60) 
0.27 
(0.60) 0.01 2.01 
6 -0.03 (0.79) 
0.06 
(0.91) 0.00 2.00 
7 -0.03 (0.79) 
0.04 
(0.95) 0.00 2.00 
8 -0.03 (0.74) 
0.00 
(1.00) 0.00 2.01 
 
 
Table 4 
h = C (P value) R sq DW 
1 0.16 (0.33) 0.01 1.51 
2 0.27 (0.27) 0.03 2.02 
3 0.23 (0.47) 0.01 2.01 
4 0.26 (0.40) 0.02 2.01 
5 0.09 (0.78) 0.00 1.99 
6 -0.04 (0.92) -0.00 1.99 
7 -0.08 (0.87) -0.00 1.99 
8 -0.14 (0.80) -0.00 2.01 
 
  
 
